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Abstract
We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for
conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple
equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics
show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood
depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters
care about their own group’s choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting
games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, the population’s size or the
groups’ composition are also done.
JEL classification: D72, C72, C73
Keywords: Turnout, coordination games, Poisson games, conformism, selection dynamics.
1 Introduction
The game theoretic literature of rational decision making predicts very low levels of turnout
in large elections. This is because the probability of making a difference (i.e. being pivotal)
is of smaller magnitude than the cost of voting for most of the citizens, which therefore
prefer abstention to the costly action of going to the polls. However this prediction conflicts
with the available evidence. People do vote and the observed turnout rates are well above
the predicted ones. Pivot probability models can generate substantial turnout rates under
specific circumstances: when there is no uncertainty and supporters of two alternatives are
of equal size (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983). As soon as uncertainty is introduced, the high
turnout equilibria disappear (Myerson, 1998; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985).
Recent attempts to rationalize higher levels of turnout within the pivot probability rely on the
assumption of ethical preferences, so that voters act as rule utilitarian maximizers (see Coate
and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006). In this context, caring about the welfare
of the representative agent in one groups increases the expected benefit from turning out to
vote. Similar effects can be obtained when voters are altruistic and therefore internalizes the
benefits of their voting choice on others (see, e.g. Fowler, 2006; Jankowski, 2007) or group
oriented (see, e.g. Morton, 1991; Uhlaner, 1986). 1
However other questioned the relevance of the pivot probability in motivating individuals to
vote. Meiroviz and Shots (2009) for example, show that when candidates are uncertain about
policy preferences of the citizens’, voting decisions can initially be dictated by signalling
considerations so as to move future policies towards some more favorable to the voter, rather
than by pivot probability considerations. In this setup turnout is substantial. Rotemberg
(2009), instead, assumes that people are more altruistic towards individuals who agree with
them and people’s well being raises when they learn that other people share the same opinions.
Those two elements act so as to reinforce expectations of voting towards one candidate and
therefore induce higher turnout regardless of pivot probability considerations.
In our paper we rely on another possible explanation for high turnout rates, still within the
pivot probability approach: social conformism. In particular, we analyze an evolutionary
model of turnout where citizens have also preference for conformism; that is, citizens like to
1The literature on why people vote is quite vast. Recent surveys are given by Dhillon and Peralta (2002)
and Geys (2006).
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do what others in a reference group are doing and the decision of whether to vote is taken by
weighting the benefit from being pivotal to the electoral outcome, the private cost of voting
and the benefit of conforming with the majority. Contrary to the models that assume a
preference (warm glow) for the act of voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968), in our model the
act of voting generates a disutility if the majority of citizens decides to abstain. Therefore
turnout is the result of the interplay between two types of mechanisms: one, which is standard
and pushes turnout rates down, leads citizens who prefer the same alternative to free ride on
others’ efforts; the other, which is due to conformism, reinforces the low willingness to vote
if there is an expectation that the others will stay home, but may also counteract it if there
is an expectation that others will turn out.
The role of conformism in fostering turnout has been suggested by many in the social sci-
ences (see, e.g. Coleman, 2004; De Matos and Barros, 2004; Klick and Parisi, 2008). However,
to the best of our knowledge, nobody has looked at the coordination issues that are at the
heart of the emergence of a norm.
The simple point we want to highlight is that when conformism matters, voting choices have
a self-enforcing nature that generates multiplicity of Nash equilibria; besides the low turnout
ones, there are also others where turnout can be significantly high. The exact magnitude of
equilibrium turnout depends on the heterogeneity in the cost of voting and on the parameter
governing the relative importance of conformism in citizens’ utilities (see the companion
paper Landi and Sodini, 2010).
Multiple equilibria generate prediction problems. In fact, one cannot consider conformism as
a sufficient factor in causing high turnout rates, unless high turnout equilibria can be justified
as being more plausible. In this paper, we contribute to the issue of equilibrium selection, by
considering a simple best response dynamics, which is an adaptation of fictitious play (Brown,
1951) to voting games. We assume that time is discrete and that at every period each citizen
knows the number of voters from the previous election and uses that information to generate
expectations about the turnout in the incoming election. These expectations are needed to
estimate the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of voting, which eventually determine
individuals’ decision to vote or not. These decisions translate into a new observed number
of voters which will then be used to update further individuals’ expectations for the next
election.
Our analysis, which is done by considering the case where conformism depends on the entire
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population and the case where conformism depends on one’s group, shows that different
cases arise. If the weigh of conformism is low, we get a unique unstable interior equilibrium
and the dynamics cycle around it. But if the weigh of conformism is sufficiently high, then
multiple equilibria arise and the dynamical analysis allows us to compare the size of the
basins of attraction of low and high turnout equilibria and to study the sensitivity of such
basins to parameter variations. We find that: Interior high turnout equilibria are unstable
when unique. When conformism depends on the behavior of the entire population, the basin
of attraction of high turnout equilibria is smaller than the no turnout equilibrium. When
conformism depends on the behavior of one’s group the basin of attraction of the no turnout
equilibrium shrinks significantly at the expenses of the high turnout equilibrium. In addition,
new corner equilibria, that are asymptotically stable, arise. They are characterized by the
fact that one group votes or abstains en masse. We then conclude that a norm of voting is
more likely to emerge in the case of strong preference for conformism and smaller reference
groups.
Dynamic models on turnout have been proposed in some recent papers. Substantial turnout
rates are possible when: voters base their choice on not too noisy polls (Diermeier and
Mieghem, 2008), since in this case the probability of being pivotal can increase substantially;
voters care about their relative ranking in the population and switch to the action (vote
or not) that will fare better than the average (Sieg and Schulz, 1995). However in this
scenario many other steady state configurations are possible, so that the authors conclude
that the evolution of turnout is ambiguous even though individual learning is unique; public
spirited behavior has an evolutionary advantage over a selfish one (Conley et al., 2006), which
requires cost of voting to be substantially nihil and low free riding opportunities from the
selfish citizens.
Unlike our model, where convergence to steady state is pretty fast, more elaborated dynamics
can be achieved in models of bounded rationality learning where agents update their actions
when aspiration levels are not met (Bendor et al., 2003) or when individuals’ decision to vote
depends on their past action and whether their favorite party has won the election (Collins
et al., 2008).
DeMichelis and Dhillon (2009) show that the only stable steady state in Palfrey and Rosen-
thal (1983) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) involves low turnout. They analyze a selection
process based on estimations of pivotal probability, endogenously updated taking into ac-
3
count information from polls or past elections. Our model is very close to DeMichelis and
Dhillon (2009), in that we share the assumption that agents form expectations about piv-
otal probability via an adaptive updating rule. However, in our model, the selection process
is also conditioned by the preference for conformity. The parameter indicating the relative
importance of conformism will dictate the chances of high turnout equilibria to emerge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the base ingredients
of the model and provides the main results. Section 3 reports the simulation results’ of our
dynamics. Section 4 concludes the paper. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The static turnout model
Consider a large population of citizens who need to choose, via majority voting, between two
exogenously given alternatives, R and L. The population is partitioned into two groups, one
that prefers R to L (call it group R) and one that prefers L to R (call it group L). The
utility received by citizens is set to 1 if their most preferred alternative is selected and 0 if
their least preferred alternative is selected. Voting is a costly activity. Let the cost of voting,
c, be an i.i.d. draw over the interval [0, 1] according to a distribution F (c) = 1− (1− c)k with
k ≥ 2. 2 This distribution is chosen to reflect the intuition that the cost of voting is mainly
small. Higher values of k imply higher probability mass around 0. Let cm = 1−2−1/k denote
the median of the cost distribution.
Each citizen simultaneously choose whether to vote for R, or L or to stay home (abstain).
The alternative that receives the majority of the votes is selected. A flip of a coin is used to
break ties (so that each alternative is equally likely to be selected).
Since there are only two alternatives, to vote for the least preferred is weakly dominated.
Therefore we can reduce the citizens’ problem to either vote for the most preferred alternative
or stay home. The payoff table can be simplified as follows:
2In our companion paper Landi and Sodini (2010) we characterize the equilibria of the static game for
single peaked cost distributions.
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P1
.
WIN LOSE
V 1− c+ δx −c+ δx
A 1 + δ(1− x) δ(1− x)
where δ > 0 denotes the relative importance of conformism and x denotes the share of
citizens who choose to vote. 3 This share will be determined within either the entire popu-
lation (population wide conformism) or the group to which one voter belongs (group based
conformism).
Following Myerson (1998, 2000), the population size is uncertain and distributed according
to a Poisson process with mean n, where n is a finite but large integer. Each citizen belongs
to group R with probability θ.
In this context, there is no loss in generality in focusing on strategies that take the form of a
pair of cutoffs (c¯R, c¯L), according to which any voter j belonging to group i votes if and only
if cj ≤ c¯ji.
In pivot probability models each player chooses to vote whenever the marginal contribution
to victory is no smaller than the marginal cost of voting. One’s vote matters whenever it
breaks a losing tie (so the two alternative have the same number of votes) or whenever it
forces a winning tie (so an alternative is ahead by one vote).
By letting ρ > 0 (λ > 0) denote the probability that a group R (L) player votes, for large
n the pivot probabilities can be approximated by the following equations (Myerson, 1998,
2000)
PR(ρ, λ, θ) =
e−n(
√
θρ−
√
(1−θ)λ)2
4
√
npi
√
θ(1− θ)λρ
√
θρ+
√
(1− θ)λ√
θρ
PL(ρ, λ, θ) =
e−n(
√
θρ−
√
(1−θ)λ)2
4
√
npi
√
θ(1− θ)λρ
√
θρ+
√
(1− θ)λ√
(1− θ)λ
When conformism is population wide, the marginal cost of voting for a j citizen is given by
cj + δ [1− 2(θρ+ (1− θ)λ)]
where the first term is the private cost which is drawn from F (c), whereas the second term
is the cost arising from conformism: if the majority of the population votes, so that θρ +
3Landi and Sodini (2010) analyze also the case of heterogenous δ.
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(1 − θ)λ ≥ 1/2, this term subtracts to the private cost of voting. On the other hand, if the
majority of the population abstains, the cost of conforming adds to it.
A symmetric equilibrium is given by the pair of cutoffs (c¯R, c¯L) ∈ [0, 1]2, common to all
players, such that no player gains from choosing a different one. The conditions to find these
cutoffs are represented by the following set of equations
PR(ρ, λ, θ) = c¯R + δ [1− 2 (θρ+ (1− θ)λ)] (1)
PL(ρ, λ, θ) = c¯L + δ [1− 2 (θρ+ (1− θ)λ)] (2)
for interior equilibria, i.e. (c¯R, c¯L) ∈ (0, 1)2, and by
PR(0, λ, θ) ≤ δ [1− λ] (3)
PL(ρ, 0, θ) ≤ δ [1− ρ] (4)
PR(1, λ, θ) ≥ 1− δλ (5)
PL(ρ, 1, θ) ≥ 1− δρ (6)
for corner equilibria, i.e. c¯i ∈ {0, 1} for some i. For example, an equilibrium of the type (0, λ)
requires all group R voters to abstain, which happens only when the marginal cost of voting
exceeds its marginal benefit for all possible private costs. This means that inequality (3) has
be satisfied. All the other inequalities can be interpreted in the same way. Note that ρ and
λ are endogenously defined by
ρ = F (c¯R) = 1− (1− c¯R)k
and
λ = F (c¯L) = 1− (1− c¯L)k
We now proceed into the characterization of the equilibria for the polar case θ = 1/2. We
then show via simulations that in large populations the effect of θ on the equilibrium cutoffs
is negligible. The first step consists in understanding that citizens in both groups pick the
same cutoffs, which simplifies considerably the equations to be analyzed.
Proposition 1. Suppose conformism is population wide and θ = 1/2. The equilibrium
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cutoffs are the same, i.e. c¯R = c¯L = c¯ and are characterized by the following equations
[2npiF (c¯)]−1/2 = c¯+ δ − 2δF (c¯) for c¯ ∈ (0, 1)
δ ≥ 1
2
for c¯ = 0
δ ≥ 1−
√
1
2npi
for c¯ = 1
Now let (cˆ, δˆ) be the unique solution to
[2npiF (c)]−1/2 = c+ δ[1− 2F (c)]
f(c)
2F (c)
√
2npiF (c)
= 2δf(c)− 1
In words, marginal cost and benefit of voting are tangent when evaluated at the pair (cˆ, δˆ).
We are in the position to fully characterize the equilibria of the game via a simple graphical
analysis (see figure 1).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Proposition 2. Suppose conformism is population wide and θ = 1/2. Let
0 < c¯1 < cm < c¯
2 < cˆ < c¯3 < 1
and δ1 = 1− (2npi)−1/2. The equilibria of the voting game are given by
(c¯1, c¯1) if and only if δ < 1/2;
(0, 0) if and only if 1/2 ≤ δ < δˆ;
(0, 0) (cˆ, cˆ) if and only if δ = δˆ;
(0, 0) (c¯2, c¯2) (c¯3, c¯3) if and only if δˆ < δ < δ1;
(0, 0) (c¯2, c¯2) (1, 1) if and only if δ ≥= δ1;
As can be seen, when δ ≥ δˆ, we have multiple equilibria, and if δ is not too large, we have two
interior equilibria. In this case voters whose private cost is below c¯2 vote in both equilibria,
those whose private cost is above c¯3 abstain in both equilibria, and those whose private cost
is between c¯2 and c¯3 do not vote if playing the equilibrium (c¯2, c¯2) but vote when playing the
equilibrium (c¯3, c¯3). Therefore, the latter equilibrium generates a higher expected turnout.
In general a higher cutoff means higher turnout, because turnout is given by nF (c¯i).
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Consider now the case where conformism is group based. The marginal cost of voting for
player j becomes 
cj + δ(1− 2ρ) if j belongs to group R
cj + δ(1− 2λ) if j belongs to group L
regardless of θ. All the equilibria that we found for the case of population wide conformism
still hold true. In fact, in this case the cutoffs for an interior equilibrium costs are obtained
from
PR(ρ, λ) = c¯R + δ [1− 2F (c¯R)] (7)
PL(ρ, λ) = c¯L + δ [1− 2F (c¯L)] (8)
For θ = 1/2 the equilibria for population wide conformism extend to this case. However
there are also other corner equilibria, where all members of one group vote or abstain, and
members of the other vote with positive probability. Thus we have:
Proposition 3. When θ = 1/2, any equilibrium found when conformism is population wide
is also an equilibrium when conformism is group based.
In addition, when conformism is group based, there are other corner equilibria, of the form
(0, c¯L), with c¯L ∈ (cm, 1] and (c¯R, 0), with c¯R ∈ (cm, 1], and (1, c¯L), with c¯L ∈ (cm, 1) and
(c¯R, 1), with c¯R ∈ (cm, 1), for δ sufficiently large.
Now let (δ˜, c˜) denote the unique solution to
e−nF (c)/2
2
= c+ δ [1− 2F (c)]
nf(c)e−nF (c)/2
4
= 1− 2δf(c)
The values of δ˜ and c˜ are computed in order to have a tangency between the marginal benefit
and cost of voting, when the two functions are computed under the assumption that one
group abstains en masse and the other votes with positive probability. Remark that δ˜ > δˆ
since (2e−nF (c)/2)−1 < (2npiF (c))−1/2 for all c ∈ [0, 1].
In addition, let δ¯ denote the lower bound of the values of δ for which an equilibrium of the
type (1, c¯L) or (c¯R, 1) exist. Given the symmetry of the pivot probability when θ = 1/2, this
lower bound is obtained as
δ¯ = 1− PR(1, c¯L, 1/2) = 1− PR(c¯R, 1, 1/2)
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We have that δ¯ is a decreasing function of c¯L and its minimum is when c¯L = 0. Note also that
at the minimum, the pivot probability is given by e−n/2/2. This allows us to conclude that
δ¯ > 1− e−n/2/2 is the minimum value for δ that generates the above mentioned equilibrium.
We are now ready to characterize the equilibria of the game under group based conformism.
Proposition 4. Suppose conformism is group based and θ = 1/2. Let
0 < c1 < cm < c
4 < cˆ < c5 < 1,
cm < c
2 < c˜ < c3 < 1
cm < c
6 < 1 and δ1 = 1− (2npi)−1/2. The equilibria of the game are given by
(c1, c1) if and only if δ < 1/2;
(0, 0) if and only if 1/2 ≤ δ < δ˜;
(0, 0) (cˆ, cˆ) if and only if δ = δˆ;
(0, 0) (c4, c4) (c5, c5) if and only if δˆ < δ < δ˜;
(0, 0) (c4, c4) (c5, c5) (0, c˜) (c˜, 0) if and only if δ = δ˜;
(0, 0) (c4, c4) (c5, c5) (0, c2) (0, c3) (c2, 0) (c3, 0) if and only if δ˜ < δ < δ1;
(0, 0) (c4, c4) (1, 1) (0, c2) (0, c3) (c2, 0) (c3, 0) if and only if δ1 ≤ δ < 1− (2en/2)−1;
(0, 0) (c4, c4) (1, 1) (0, c2) (0, 1) (c2, 0) (1, 0) (1, c6) (c6, 1) if and only if δ ≥ 1− (2en/2)−1;
When conformism is group based, we have a plethora of corner equilibria, for sufficiently
high values of δ. In other words, if conformism matters, and only the behavior of one’s group
is relevant, whatever one group decides to coordinate upon is an equilibrium, regardless of
what the other group is playing. In fact, when conformism is relatively important in the
individuals’ preferences and depends on one’s group behavior, the free riding problem due to
pivot probability considerations is less stringent: the cost of not conforming outweighs the
cost of voting.
The next section is devoted to the analysis of the dynamic version of this model, which will
help highlighting features related to equilibrium selection.
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3 Dynamics
Our evolutionary analysis is based on a simple best response dynamics. To reduce consider-
ably the computation time we assume the size of the population of players is constant at the
value n. The share of R voters is given by θ. Each voter has a private cost of voting, which
is not time dependent, randomly drawn from the cost distribution F (c) = 1− (1− c)k, with
k ≥ 1. Time is discrete and at every period t+ 1 each citizen knows the number of voters for
every group at period t, ni(t), with i = l, r.
The expected number of voters in group R (resp. L) is given by n(1 − θ)λ(t + 1) (resp.
nθρ(t + 1)). Citizens have static expectations about others decisions to vote, and use the
equation for expected voters to infer the values of λ(t + 1) and ρ(t + 1) from the level of
turnout observed at time t. Namely, voters estimates these two probabilities as
λ(t+ 1) =
nl(t)
(1− θ)n
and
ρ(t+ 1) =
nr(t)
θn
Those values are then used to compute the pivot probabilities
P˜L(nr(t+ 1), nl(t+ 1)) =
e−(
√
nr(t)−
√
nl(t))
2
4
√
pi
√
nr(t)nl(t)
(√
nr(t) +
√
nl(t)√
nl(t)
)
(9)
and
P˜R(nr(t+ 1), nl(t+ 1)) =
e−(
√
nr(t)−
√
nl(t))
2
4
√
pi
√
nr(t)nl(t)
(√
nr(t) +
√
nl(t)√
nr(t)
)
(10)
and the net cost of participating
cj + δ
[
1− 2
n
(nr(t) + nl(t))
]
with cj being the private cost of citizen j. At time t+1 all citizens need to decide whether to
vote or not, and they do it by comparing the estimated marginal benefits to their marginal
cost. All citizens whose expected marginal benefit does not fall below their marginal cost
choose to vote. The others abstain. Specifically, for citizen j with private cost cj and
belonging to group i the behavioral rule becomes
if P˜i(nr(t), nl(t)) ≥ cj + δ
[
1− 2n(nr(t) + nl(t))
]
then j votes
if P˜i(nr(t), nl(t)) < cj + δ
[
1− 2n(nr(t) + nl(t))
]
then j abstains
(11)
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These decisions generate a new observed number of voters which will then be used to update
further each voters expectations at t+ 2.
Let the state of the system be denoted by the pair (nr(t), nl(t)) which, again, indicates the
number of group R and group L voters at time t. Condition (11) generates a deterministic
transition dynamics
(nr(t+ 1), nl(t+ 1)) = G(nr(t), nl(t)) (12)
Definition 1. A steady state of (12) is a pair (n¯r, n¯l) that is time invariant, that is G(n¯r, n¯l) =
(n¯r, n¯l). The basin of attraction of a steady state is the set of initial conditions (nr, nl) for
which the dynamics (12) converge to that steady state. The size of the basin of attraction is
given by the number of its elements divided by the total number of states.
We are interested in the size of the basin of attraction of a steady state because it can be
interpreted as the probability that the dynamics converge to that steady state. Note also
that steady states of this best response dynamics and equilibria of the static game are related
to each other. Specifically:
Proposition 5. Let (c¯R, c¯L) denote an equilibrium of the base game. The pair (n¯r, n¯l), with
n¯r = nθF (c¯R) and n¯l = n(1− θ)F (c¯L) is a steady state of (12).
Since the number n of players is finite, the set of possible states under dynamics (12) is finite,
that is (nr, nl) ≤ (nθ, n(1− θ)). Consequently, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6. Every orbit under dynamics (12) approaches either a steady state or a
periodic orbit.
We analyze the asymptotic behavior of dynamics (12) by numerical simulations. The simu-
lations have been implemented according to the following algorithm:
1. Fix the values of the parameters of the model, such as population size (n), intensity
of conformism in players’ utility (δ), share of group R citizens (θ) and value of the
parameter governing the cost distribution (k).
2. Generate the stochastic costs, drawn from the distribution F (c) = 1 − (1 − c)k. This
generation is done once and for all, so that the cost of voting does not change within one
complete iteration of the simulation. Redrawing the cost of voting at each step would
not change the results, since n = 100, 000 (at least), but would increase significantly
the computational time.
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3. Compute the equilibria of the static game, which correspond to the steady states of the
myopic best response under investigation.
4. Generate the initial conditions (i.e. who votes and who abstains in the entire popula-
tion) and iterate the best response behavior as highlighted in (11). Note that, at each
round, all the players update their behavior. By restricting the number of citizens that,
at each time, can update their choice we potentially increase the chances of convergence
of the evolutionary dynamics.
5. Check whether the state of the system has reached one of the steady states of dynamics
or whether has oscillated between states.
The base model consists of equal size populations of R and L voters and conformism depends
on the behavior of the entire population. Our results for the static model show that (see
proposition 2) there can be one or two interior equilibria, one or two corner equilibria, and
these equilibria can coexist depending on the underlying parameters. The simulations’ results
for the best response dynamics with static expectations are reported in table 1 and in figure 2
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
Specifically, we have that for low values of δ, when only the low turnout equilibrium exists, the
dynamics cycle around it (see the column called oscillating in the table, and the trajectories of
the dynamics (12) in figure 2). As δ becomes larger, initially the equilibrium shifts to nobody
votes, which becomes also asymptotically stable (see again the trajectories in figure 2). This
further increases of δ make the high turnout interior equilibria to appear. The largest of the
two is asymptotically stable (see the black coloring in figure 3). But the equilibrium where
nobody votes still remains asymptotically stable. However, its basin of attraction diminishes
with δ. Therefore the set of initial conditions that converge to the high turnout equilibrium
increases with δ.
The next step of the simulations involves comparative statics on the parameters of the model,
such as θ, n, δ and k. Table 2 reports the comparative statics for the change in population
size, with δ = 0.58, k = 4, and θ = 0.5.
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[Table 2 about here.]
As we can see, as n increases, the basin of attraction of the interior steady state remains
practically unaltered. Given the specified set of parameters, the system converges to either
the interior or the no vote steady state, depending on the initial conditions. Note also
that the share of citizens voting in the interior steady state is substantially constant, when
nL ≥ 50, 000, and so is the shape of the basin of attraction.
Next we study the roles played by θ and by δ. Table 3 reports the results of the simulations
with n = 100, 000 and k = 4. As the equilibria are symmetric with respect to θ, to economize
on space table 3 (and the similar tables who follow) reports only the values of θ ≥ 0.5.
[Table 3 about here.]
We can observe some patterns that were already highlighted in the symmetric case. Namely:
1. As δ increases the high turnout equilibrium approaches to all vote.
2. The basin of attraction for the high turnout equilibrium increases with δ, at any level
of θ: the stronger the preference for conformism, the more likely it is to select the high
turnout equilibrium.
3. The shape and size of the basins of attraction of the asymptotically stable equilibria is
affected by θ: as we move away from θ = 0.5, the basins of attraction lose in symmetry
(see figure 4 for a sample case) as the slope of the line separating them changes. In
addition, the set of initial conditions that converge to the interior equilibrium expands.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Last, we study the role of k, the parameter governing the cost distribution. The larger k,
the more right skewed the costs are, so that the higher the mass about low levels of costs.
Table 4 reports the results of the simulations for groups of size 100, 000 each.
[Table 4 about here.]
We observe that as k grows, the turnout level evaluated at the interior steady state increases
and eventually converges to all vote; furthermore, its basin of attraction grows, as can also
be seen from figure 5, where the black area increases with k.
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[Figure 5 about here.]
A similar analysis can be done for the case where conformism depends on the behavior of
one’s group. Our analysis of the static game has showed that in this context there are other
corner equilibria, where one group votes and the other abstains. Our simulations show that
these equilibria are also asymptotically stable steady states of the best response dynamics.
First we report the simulation results for the case where groups are of equal size, and δ varies.
They are reported in table 5 and in figure 7, for the parameter specification n = 200, 000,
θ = 0.5 and k = 4.
[Table 5 about here.]
As for the base case with conformism that depends on the whole population’s behavior,
with low levels of δ there is only a low turnout equilibrium and the dynamics cycle around
it. As δ grows, the no vote equilibrium appears and becomes asymptotically stable. For
further increases of δ the interior high turnout equilibria and the corner equilibria where
one group votes and the other abstains arise. Both are stable. Two new tones of grey are
observable in figure 7, on the top left and bottom right corners. They indicate the set of
all initial conditions for which the system converges to these new corner equilibria. Their
basins of attraction increase with δ, at the expense of the no vote equilibrium, whose basin
of attraction shrinks. When conformism depends on one’s group behavior, the chances of
observing equilibria with high turnout are much larger.
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
Like before, an increase in n is not changing significantly the results. The next step therefore
involves analyzing the behavior of the dynamics as δ and θ change. Table 6 reports the
simulation results for the parameter specification n = 100, 000 and k = 4.
[Table 6 about here.]
As before, an increase in δ makes the interior equilibrium converge to the point where ev-
erybody votes. In addition, its basin of attraction increases with δ. A weak increase is also
observed for the corner equilibria where one group votes and the other abstains. Overall
the equilibrium in which nobody votes becomes less likely to emerge when δ increases. Note
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that in this case the value of θ does not matter: the symmetry of the basins of attraction is
preserved regardless of θ (see figure 8). This depends on the fact that θ does not affect the
conformism equations, while it affects only marginally the pivot probabilities.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Last, table 7 reports the comparative statics with respect to changes in k.
[Table 7 about here.]
As before, an increase in k makes the basins of attraction of the interior and the corner
equilibria larger.
An interesting feature of the model comes from the role of the preference for conformism:
when conformism is based on one’s group’s behavior, the high turnout interior equilibrium
is less like to emerge at the expenses of corner solutions where one of the two groups votes
and the other abstains. When the preference for conformism is strong enough, in other
words, people prefer to behave with the majority in their own group regardless of the pivot
probabilities. Paradoxically, there can be results where the majority stays home and the
minority turns out and wins the election! In comparison to De Matos and Barros (2004),
who analyzed the role of contagion in a structured network where initially only few vote,
setting aside any electoral competition effect. What they find, therefore, is consistent with
our within group behavior in this context.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents an evolutionary analysis of a model of turnout where citizens have prefer-
ence for conformism. If conformism plays a non marginal role in citizens’ utilities, the voting
game has multiple equilibria, and high turnout rates are observable. However low turnout
rates are always observable.
Both high and low turnout equilibria are asymptotically under our simple best response
selection dynamics. The basin of attraction of high turnout equilibria increases in size as
conformism becomes more important in citizens’ utility. However the low turnout equilibrium
has always a larger basins of attraction when conformism depends on the aggregate choice in
the entire population, whereas it has a smaller basins of attraction when conformism depends
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on the choice made by one’s political group. Therefore the type of reference group matters
in stimulating high turnout rates.
Finally, in this model, turnout is interpreted as the solution of two types of coordination
problems: one, which is standard to pivot probability models, is due by the tendency of
citizens who are on the same side of the political spectrum to free ride on others’ efforts.
This (lack of) coordination pushes turnout rates down. The other, with the population at
large (but not necessarily so) whereby others’ actions directly influence one’s utility. Such a
coordination effect may reinforce the low willingness to vote if there is an expectation that
the many will stay home, but may also counteract it if there is an expectation that many will
turn out.
We have seen how important is the role of the reference group for conformism in directing
coordination towards high or low turnout equilibria. The next step of this research agenda
aims at pointing the magnifying glass to the network structures that make coordination on
high turnout rates more likely to emerge.
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A Proof of main results
Proof of Proposition 1. An interior equilibrium needs to solve equations (1) and (2). By
taking the ratio between these two equations, one condition can be written as√
F (c¯L)
F (c¯R)
=
c¯R + δ (1− F (c¯L)− F (c¯R))
c¯L + δ (1− F (c¯L)− F (c¯R)) (13)
Note that c¯R = c¯L = c¯ is a solution to this equation. Moreover it is unique. Suppose in fact
that c¯L > c¯L is another solution. Then the left hand side of equation (13) is greater than 1
while the right hand side is smaller than 1. The opposite holds if c¯L < c¯L.
Next observe that (0, 0) is an equilibrium if and only if conditions (3) and (4) are met. Since
the pivot probability at the origin are 1/2, those conditions require δ ≥ 1/2.
Moreover, (1, 1) is an equilibrium if and only if conditions (5) and (6) are met. The pivot
probabilities when everybody votes can be approximated by (2npi)−1/2. Hence we need
δ ≥ 1− (2npi)−1/2. Landi and Sodini (2010) show there are no other corner equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3. By repeating the steps undertaken in the proof of Proposition 1 one
immediately sees that the interior equilibria and the corner equilibria of the type (0, 0) and
(1, 1) are the same.
In addition, since θ = 1/2, the conditions for corner equilibria of the type (0, c¯L) and (c¯R, 0),
or (1, c¯L) and (c¯R, 1) are the same. Hence it is enough to consider one case each.
(0, c¯L) is an equilibrium if and only if
PR(0, F (c¯L), 1/2) ≤ δ
PL(0, F (c¯L), 1/2) = c¯L + δ(1− 2F (c¯L))
By plugging the corresponding values for the pivot probabilities and rearranging, one gets
δ ≥ e
−nF (c¯L)/2
2
[
1 +
nF (c¯L)
2
]
(14)
e−nF (c¯L)/2
2
= c¯L + δ [1− 2F (c¯L)] (15)
First observe that the right hand side in inequality (14) is a decreasing function of c¯L at
has a peak at zero which is given by 1/2. Moreover, the right and the left hand side of
equation (15) behave similarly to those in figure 1. This tells us that a necessary condition
for both equality and inequality to happen is that δ ≥ 1/2. In fact, for lower values of δ, the
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solution to equation (15) would happen at a low value of c¯L which would require a higher
value of δ for inequality (14) to hold.
Following the logic from figure 1, if we let (δ˜, c˜) denote the unique solution to
e−nF (c)/2
2
= c+ δ [1− 2F (c)]
nf(c)e−nF (c)/2
4
= 1− 2δf(c)
we have that equation (15) has two interior solutions for any δ > δ˜. One of these solutions
converges to 1 as δ approaches 1 − (2en/2)−1. Both solutions are when δ is large enough to
satisfy inequality (14).
Similarly, (1, c¯L) is an equilibrium if and only if
PR(1, F (c¯L), 1/2) ≥ 1− δ (16)
PL(1, F (c¯L), 1/2) = c¯L + δ(1− 2F (c¯L)) (17)
Observe that both probabilities are increasing in c¯L and therefore reach a peak when c¯L = 1.
This means that equation (17) has no solutions for δ sufficiently small, whereas it has two
and then one solutions are δ grows. If we let δ¯ denote the lower bound of the values of δ for
which an equilibrium of the type (1, c¯L) exist, this lower bound is obtained as
δ¯ = 1− PR(1, c¯L, 1/2) = 1− PR(c¯R, 1, 1/2)
The values of δ for which solutions to equation (17) exist, and for which inequality (16) is
satisfied are going to be very close to 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose we have an equilibrium (c¯R, c¯R). Therefore this pair satisfies
the set of conditions (1) to (6). By the law of large numbers the number of voters for each
group is
nr(t) = θnF (c¯R)
nl(t) = (1− θ)nF (c¯L))
and therefore the estimated probability of vote for each type is given by
ρt+1 = F (c¯R)
λt+1 = F (c¯R)
20
This implies that the estimated pivot probabilities corresponds to the equilibrium pivot prob-
abilities. Hence group i voter with private cost cj votes if and only if cj ≤ c¯i.
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Figure 1: Equilibria as a function of δ, with n = 1, 00 and F (c) = c(2− c). Interior equilibria
are obtained as the intersection between two curves, the marginal benefit of voting (in blue),
which decreases exponentially with c, and the marginal cost of voting, which changes with
respect to δ, but passes through (cm, cm) for all values of δ. Corner equilibria are achieved
by comparing marginal costs and benefits at the extremes, c = 0 and c = 1.
δ = 0.25
δ = 0.5
δ = δˆ
δ = δ1
cm
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Figure 2: Trajectories of the dynamics when δ is small.
(a) Trajectories when δ = 0.1. The system cycles about the low
turnout equilibrium.
(b) Trajectories when δ = 0.5. The system converges to the no vote equi-
librium.
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Figure 3: Basins of attraction for the asymptotically stable steady states as δ changes. The
black area represents the basin of attraction for the high turnout equilibrium, the light grey
area is for the no vote equilibrium. Steady states are represented by white circles.
(a) Basins of attraction when δ = 0.7. (b) Basins of attraction when δ = 0.9.
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Figure 4: Basins of attractions for the asymptotically stable steady states when groups
have different sizes. The black area represents the basin of attraction for the high turnout
equilibrium, the light grey area is for the no vote equilibrium. Steady states are represented
by white circles.
(a) Basins of attraction when θ = 0.9.
(b) Basins of attraction when θ = 0.8.
(c) Basins of attraction when θ = 0.4.
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Figure 5: Basins of attractions for the asymptotically stable steady states as k changes. The
black area represents the basin of attraction for the high turnout equilibrium, the light grey
area is for the no vote equilibrium. Steady states are represented by white circles.
(a) Basins of attraction when k = 5.
(b) Basins of attraction when k = 9.
(c) Basins of attraction when k = 16.
26
Figure 6: Trajectories for low values of δ.
(a) Trajectories when δ = 0.3. The system cycles about the low
turnout equilibrium.
(b) Trajectories when δ = 0.5. The system converges to the no vote
equilibrium.
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Figure 7: Basins of attraction for the asymptotically stable steady states as δ increases,
and conformism depends on one’s group behavior. The black area represents the basin of
attraction of the high turnout equilibrium, the grey for the no vote equilibrium. The other
shades of light grey represent the basin of attraction of the corner equilibria where one group
abstains and the other votes with high probability.
(a) Basins of attraction when δ = 0.7.
(b) Basins of attraction when δ = 0.9.
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Figure 8: Basins of attraction for the asymptotically stable steady states when groups have
different size. The black are represents the basin of attraction of the high turnout equilibrium,
the grey for the no vote equilibrium. The other shades of light grey represent the basin of
attraction of the corner equilibria where one group abstains and the other votes with high
probability.
(a) Basins of attraction when θ = 0.9.
(b) Basins of attraction when θ = 0.8.
(c) Basins of attraction when θ = 0.6.
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Table 1: Size of basin of attraction and value of steady states as a function of δ, with k = 4,
θ = 0.5 and n = 200, 000. pr(i) denotes the fraction of initial conditions that converge to an
interior high turnout steady state; pr(nobody) denotes the share of the initial conditions that
converge to the steady stated where nobody votes; pr(oscillating) denotes the share of initial
conditions that cycle; s.s.L (s.s.R.) indicates the steady state number of voters for group L
(R).
δ pr(i) pr(nobody) pr(oscillating) s.s.L=s.s.R.
0.1 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.2 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.3 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.4 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.5 0.00 1.00 0.00 -
0.6 0.15 0.85 0.00 96,008
0.7 0.22 0.78 0.00 99,047
0.8 0.26 0.74 0.00 99,834
0.9 0.30 0.70 0.00 99,990
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Table 2: Size of basin of attraction and value of interior steady state as a function of n, with
δ = 0.58, k = 4, and θ = 0.5.
nL = nR pr(i) pr(nobody) s.s.L=s.s.R
100 0.10 0.88 97
50,000 0.12 0.88 47,357
60,000 0.12 0.88 56,820
70,000 0.12 0.88 66,282
80,000 0.13 0.87 75,744
90,000 0.12 0.88 85,205
100,000 0.13 0.87 94,666
120,000 0.12 0.88 113,587
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Table 3: Size of basin of attraction and value of interior steady state as a function of δ and
θ, with n = 100, 000 and k = 4.
δ θ pr(i) pr(nobody) s.s.L s.s.R
0.5 0.5 0.00 1.00 - -
0.5 0.7 0.00 1.00 - -
0.5 0.9 0.00 1.00 - -
0.7 0.5 0.22 0.78 49,526 49,526
0.7 0.7 0.25 0.75 29,716 69,337
0.7 0.9 0.31 0.69 9,905 89,147
0.9 0.5 0.30 0.70 49,995 49,995
0.9 0.7 0.34 0.66 29,997 69,993
0.9 0.9 0.38 0.63 9,999 89,991
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Table 4: Size of basin of attraction and value of interior steady state as a function of k, with
n = 200, 000, θ = 0.5, and δ = 0.6.
k pr(i) pr(nobody) s.s.L = s.s.R.
4 0.15 0.85 96,008
5 0.23 0.77 98,789
6 0.28 0.71 99,563
7 0.32 0.68 99,833
8 0.35 0.65 99,935
9 0.37 0.63 99,974
10 0.38 0.62 99,990
11 0.39 0.61 99,996
12 0.41 0.59 99,998
13 0.42 0.58 99,999
14 0.42 0.58 100,000
15 0.43 0.57 100,000
16 0.44 0.56 100,000
17 0.44 0.56 100,000
18 0.45 0.55 100,000
19 0.45 0.55 100,000
20 0.45 0.55 100,000
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Table 5: Size of basin of attraction and value of steady states as a function of δ, with k = 4,
θ = 0.5 and n = 200, 000. Conformism depends on one’s group’s behavior. pr(cor R = 0)
[pr(cor L = 0)] denotes the share of initial conditions that converge to a steady state where
all group R [L] citizens abstain.
δ pr(i) pr(nobody) pr(cor R=0) pr(cor L=0) pr(oscillating) s.s.L. = s.s.R.
0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
0.5 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
0.6 0.07 0.53 0.20 0.20 0.00 96,008
0.7 0.11 0.45 0.22 0.22 0.00 99,047
0.8 0.13 0.41 0.23 0.23 0.00 99,834
0.9 0.15 0.37 0.24 0.24 0.00 99,990
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Table 6: Size of basin of attraction and value of interior steady state as a function of δ and
θ, with n = 100, 000 and k = 4.
δ θ pr(i) pr(nobody) pr(corner L=0) pr(corner R=0) s.s.L. s.s.R.
0.5 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 - -
0.5 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 - -
0.5 0.90 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 - -
0.7 0.50 0.11 0.45 0.22 0.22 49,526 49,526
0.7 0.70 0.11 0.45 0.22 0.22 29,710 69,324
0.7 0.90 0.11 0.44 0.21 0.24 9,903.37 89,130.34
0.9 0.50 0.15 0.37 0.24 0.24 49,995 49,995
0.9 0.70 0.15 0.37 0.23 0.25 29,997 69,993
0.9 0.90 0.15 0.37 0.23 0.25 9,998.99 89,990.93
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Table 7: Size of basin of attraction and value of interior steady state as a function of k, with
n = 200, 000, θ = 0.5, and δ = 0.6.
k pr(i) pr(nobody) pr( corner L=0) pr(corner R=0) s.s.L. = s.s.R.
4 0.07 0.53 0.20 0.20 96,008
5 0.12 0.44 0.22 0.22 98,789
6 0.14 0.38 0.24 0.24 99,563
7 0.16 0.36 0.24 0.24 99,833
8 0.18 0.34 0.24 0.24 99,935
9 0.18 0.32 0.25 0.25 99,974
10 0.19 0.31 0.25 0.25 99,990
11 0.20 0.30 0.25 0.25 99,996
12 0.20 0.30 0.25 0.25 99,998
13 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.25 99,999
14 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.25 100,000
15 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.25 100,000
16 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.25 100,000
17 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.25 100,000
18 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.25 100,000
19 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.25 100,000
20 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.25 100,000
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